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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of the dissemination of modern irrigation systems, i.e. 
private wells with pumps, on the livelihood not only among the farmers who have 
access to wells but also among the farmers who have no access to wells and thus rely 
solely on traditional irrigation systems called tank irrigation systems.    The analysis is 
based on a village and household data set collected in Tamil Nadu, India where tank 
irrigation systems have been managed collectively for rice cultivation.    Our statistical 
analyses predict that once declines in collective management occur due to the 
dissemination of private wells, the rice yield and income of the no-well-access farmers 
alone will decrease, resulting in increased poverty among them.    Our analyses also find 
that the dissemination leads to the overexploitation of groundwater, and thus results in 
no significant increase in rice profit among the well-access farmers.    In this way, the 
dissemination of private wells creates double tragedies: not only increased poverty 
among the no-well-access farmers but also overexploitation and profit reduction among 
the well-access farmers. 
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1.  Introduction 
 International  attention  to water scarcity in developing countries has been 
increasing (e.g. the series of World Water Forums), and with this increasing attention 
has come the realization that efficient water management is crucial for sustainable 
development.    In agricultural sectors in developing Asian countries, a major recent 
change in water management systems is the rapid spread of pumps and wells (modern 
irrigation systems) and the decline in traditional irrigation systems such as tanks in 
Tamil Nadu, India.    Facing this transition under increasing water scarcity, people are 
raising questions of whether water is used efficiently under the modern irrigation 
systems and how the decline in the traditional systems affects the poor farmers who are 
usually the last group of people to adopt the modern systems.    This paper aims to 
investigate these questions using a case in Tamil Nadu.     
  Tank irrigation systems collectively operated and managed by informal local 
bodies have been a dominant source of irrigation in South India since time immemorial 
(Palanisami, 2000).    However, in the last two decades a massive diffusion of private 
wells and pumps has occurred throughout India due to sharp declines in investment and 
operation costs; Tamil Nadu has been no exception.    There the percent share of 
agricultural area under well irrigation increased from 26 per cent in the 1960’s to 42 per 
cent in the 1990’s, while the share under tanks declined from 38 per cent to 22 per cent   4
over the same period (Fertilizer Association of India, various  issues).  This 
replacement process has been associated with significant increases in the average yield 
of rice, a staple crop in the area, and in the average income level of farmers. 
  Despite such positive effects on average, there is concern that the replacement 
of tanks by private wells is associated with increased poverty.    Access to water from 
tanks is available to all the farmers in the system command area in principle.    Access 
to irrigation water from private wells, however, is limited to owners and to those who 
can buy from the owners.    Private wells provide freedom in irrigation water control 
and thus those who have access can increase their yields and incomes.    Since the tank 
is an indivisible technology, when farmers with access to private wells exit from the 
collective management of their tank system — out of disinterest or loss of incentive — 
it becomes difficult for the remaining smaller number of users to provide a sufficient 
level of maintenance work.    When the decline in collective management happens, 
farmers who are dependent on tanks suffer while farmers who have recourse to private 
wells can still achieve high levels of incomes and crop yields.    In this way, the farmers 
without access to private wells suffer negative effects created by other farmers’ exit 
from the collective management, leading to increased poverty among the without-access 
farmers.     5
  The story does not end here; a problem arises also among well users.    Since 
the groundwater is a typical example of common pool resources under open access, in 
his/her profit maximization, each individual user does not take account of the existence 
of a negative externality he/she imposes to other users, resulting in the exploitation of 
groundwater beyond a social optimum level.    Therefore, eventually, the well users 
become unable to earn rice profit as much as they used to do.     
  Based on the argument above, we advance  two  hypotheses.  First,  the 
dissemination of private wells leads to the decline in collective management, and, then, 
once the decline occurs, the rice yield and income of the non-well users alone will 
decrease, resulting in increased poverty among them.    It has been already empirically 
shown that the dissemination of private wells leads to the decline in collective 
management (Kajisa et al., 2004).    Hence, this paper focus on an empirical question of 
whether the decline leads to increased poverty or not.    The second hypothesis to be 
tested is that the dissemination leads to the overexploitation of groundwater, resulting in 
no significant increase in rice profit among the well users.     
  This study is based on our survey of 79 tank irrigated villages randomly 
selected from four contiguous districts (Madurai, Ramnad, Virudunagar, and Sivaganga) 
in southern Tamil Nadu state, India in 1999.    In these districts rice is the dominant crop,   6
irrigated mainly by tanks supplemented by wells.    In each village, we conducted a 
group interview to collect information on the management of tank irrigation as well as 
on village characteristics.    We also interviewed 450 rice-farming households, randomly 
selected with a sample of 5 or 6 households from each village.     
 
2.  The impact of the decline in collective management on poverty 
Measuring collective management 
  To evaluate the impact of the decline in collective management, the first step we 
have to take is to measure the overall status of the collective actions devoted to tank 
management in the survey year as compared with the past.    There are two approaches: 
(1) evaluating the condition of irrigation systems as a resulting indicator of effective 
collective management; and, (2) evaluating the degree of cooperation within the 
collective management.
1  The  former  approach  is  not  appropriate for our case due to 
difficulties in isolating the current status of irrigation from the influence of exogenous 
environmental conditions and from accumulated past successes or failures in collective 
                                                 
1  Examples of the former approach include Bardhan (2000) where he uses the index of quality 
of maintenance of distributaries and channels and Dayton-Johnson (2000) where he uses the 
conditions of canals as the proxy for the existence of collective action.    Bardhan (2000) also 
uses the latter approach where he uses the number of conflicts and the frequency of rule 
violations  among  beneficiaries.  Another  example  of the latter approach is Fujiie, et al. (2005) 
where they measure cooperation in terms of the success or failure in organizing several water 
management related activities.       7
management.    Therefore, we use the latter approach, although this approach, also, 
presents difficulties.    Past studies generate a dichotomous variable because of the 
difficulty in objectively ranking the degree of cooperation.    We could generate a 
dummy for each of the three tasks of collective management: de-silting, channel 
cleaning, and the arrangement of water distribution.  However,  evaluating  each 
separately will not necessarily provide useful information regarding overall status 
because the activities may be mutually substitutable, so that that the lack of one activity 
will not necessarily mean an overall decline (Fujiie et al., 2005).    Moreover, a lack of 
de-silting and channel cleaning does not necessarily mean that management declined in 
the survey year because those activities are carried out according to need.    In order for 
the second approach to produce appropriate measurements, we must be able to measure 
the overall status in the survey year. 
  The approach we take is to use the dichotomous response of key village 
informants to the question of whether the informal water users’ organization (WUO) is 
active or inactive in the survey year; the dummy takes the value one if inactive.    We 
consider this dummy variable to be an appropriate proxy for measuring tank 
management activity because firstly, it evaluates the overall status of the collective 
management, and secondly, it evaluates the status in the survey year.    Although this   8
variable is somewhat arbitrary, it is the best available proxy that we could think of, 
having high correlation with other proxy variables and performing better in the 
regression analysis than other proxy variables.
2 
Using this dummy as our measure, we classified the villages into those with and 
those without active collective management, and we found that the number of “inactive 
villages,” (that is without active collective management) is 31 (39%) and the number of 
“active villages” is 48 (61%). 
 
Binary comparison 
  In order to develop an understanding of the impact of the decline in collective 
management, we compare the yield, the per capita monthly income, and the per capita 
monthly consumption value among 171 households in the 31 inactive villages and 279 
households in the 48 active villages.
3    These data are displayed in Table 1.    The 
                                                 
2  This inactive WUO dummy has a high correlation (correlation coefficient 0.75) with a dummy 
that becomes one when channel cleaning had not been conducted in the last three years, 
indicating the consistency of villagers’ cleaning behavior and the subjective evaluation of the 
overall status.    The inactive WUO dummy is consistent also with water supply conditions.   
Among the inactive villages according to the classification of our variable, 48 per cent of the 
villages claimed that the availability of tank water had worsened, whereas the corresponding 
percentage goes down to 29 per cent in the active villages.    Moreover, in the active villages, 
even in those which claimed that the situation had worsened, the majority claimed that the 
reason was bad rainfall rather than the poor management of irrigation facilities, whereas this 
was reversed in the inactive villages. 
3  The weights used for computation of adult equivalent household size are 0.5 for a child of age 
below 5 years, 0.73 for a child 6-10 years, 0.83 for a child 11-14 years, 0.83 for a female above 
14 years, and 1.0 for males above 14 years (Rao, 1983).    Household members living outside of 
the household because of work are excluded but members living outside because of educational   9
difference in rice yields is clear: row (1) shows that rice yield in kg per hectare is lower 
in the inactive villages than in the active villages and the difference is statistically 
significant.    The lower average yield leads to lower average income and consumption 
level as shown in rows (2) and (3).
4    The comparison of poverty indexes shows that not 
only the incidence of poverty but also the poverty gap is higher in the inactive villages.
5  
These poverty indexes are consistent with the villagers’ subjective assessment of their 
poverty conditions presented in row (4); a larger percentage of villages in the inactive 
villages judged that they are in serious poverty than villages in the active villages.   
These results imply the existence of impacts of the decline on increased poverty.     
 
Regression analyses 
  In order to confirm that the decline in management is the reason for the 
increased poverty even after controlling for other possible determinants, we estimate the 
reduced form regression functions explaining the rice yield, the income, and the 
consumption value.    For this purpose, we include the village level inactive 
                                                                                                                                               
pursuit are included as members of the household, on the assumption that students receive 
financial support from the household. 
4  The means of consumption values are not statistically different, presumably due to the 
existence of consumption smoothing mechanisms to some extent.     
5  Use of the national poverty line of Rs. 324 monthly per capita for 1993-4, instead of US$ 1, 
does not change the qualitative results.    The same applies to the comparison of the 
consumption value.   10
management dummy as one of the explanatory variables.    Also important is the 
household level variable which measures the inaccessibility to private wells.    This is a 
dichotomous variable: non-well-owners who did not buy water from well owners are 
classified into the no-access group (dummy=1), while the owners and the non-owners 
with water transaction records are classified into the access group (dummy=0).    The 
differential impacts of the decline between the farmers with access and those without 
access are, therefore, captured by considering four different cases.    Using the case of 
farmers having access to wells at an active village as the base (Access&Active), we 
construct three irrigation status dummies: (1) no-access at an active village 
(No-Access&Active), (2) no-access at an inactive village (No-Access&Inactive), (3) 
access at an inactive village (Access&Inactive).   
  We must also control for the distance from the irrigation source to the farmers’ 
fields because in gravity irrigation systems like tank systems the distance affects the 
availability  of  water.  Moreover,  the  affect of distance may vary depending on the 
status of the collective management and well access.    In our explanatory variables, we 
include not only the distance from the tank but also the interaction of distance with our 
three irrigation status dummies. 
  Consequently, our regression equations include six explanatory variables   11
containing information on the status of the accessibility to wells.    The accessibility to 
wells, however, potentially entails endogeneity and measurement biases.
6  These 
potential biases, if any detected, are controlled by the instrumental variable (IV) 
method.
7   
  The other determinants included are a set of household human asset and physical 
asset variables, socio economic characteristics, and village level characteristics.    The 
definitions of these variables and descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix Table 
A1.   
  The estimated yield, income, and consumption value by irrigation status are 
presented on the columns (1) to (3) in Table 2.    These figures are based on the 
regression results reported in Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix.    One obvious result on 
the column (1) is that the yields of the farmers with access to wells (first two rows) are 
higher than those of the farmers without access (third and fourth rows).    A more 
important finding for our research purpose is the differential impacts of the decline in 
                                                 
6  There are two kinds of potential bias.    First, under our definition of this dummy variable, the 
no-access group would include non-owner farmers who actually have access to well irrigation 
but chose not to use it because they had enough water from tanks or rainfall.    These farmers 
presumably achieve yield and income as high as the farmers who use wells.    The incorrect 
inclusion of them in the no-access group would result in the underestimation of the negative 
impact of non-access.    Second, if high income farmers selectively became well owners, the 
impact of non-access would be overestimated.     
7  The identifying instrumental variables that explain the six potentially endogenous variables 
include not only those that explain non-access to wells — such as the number of water sellers in 
a village, the number of water buyers in a village, the cost of well digging and its squared term, 
and the value of house building — but also the interactions of those variables with the inactive 
management dummy and further with distance from the tank (Wooldridge, 2002).   12
collective  management.  Interestingly,  among the with-access farmers, the decline 
increases the yield from 3979 kg to 4088 kg.    Nevertheless, the difference is marginal.   
Contrary to this result, among the without-access farmers, the decline reduces the yield 
from 3642 kg to 3225 kg by 417 kg.    As a result of these differential impacts on the 
yields, the figures reported on the columns (2) and (3) shows that while the with-access 
farmers’ income/consumption is not affected by the decline, that of the 
without-access-farmers drops from Rs. 342 to Rs. 262 by Rs. 80 in terms of income or 
from Rs. 307 to Rs. 263 by Rs. 44 in terms of consumption value.    The amount of 
reduction in income is almost a quarter of the income before the decline.    This 
substantial reduction makes the average income of the without-access-farmers be very 
close to the poverty line (Rs. 259) and thus some of them in lower income percentile 
group may fall into poverty.   
 
Counter-factual analysis 
  The reduction of income is predicted in the regression analyses.    However, we 
are not clear yet whether this reduction is large enough to increase poverty.    If it is 
large enough, the revitalization of collective management should reduce poverty.    In 
order to examine this, we run simulation analyses.    Using the regression results and   13
assuming that collective management is revitalized at currently inactive villages, we 
predict the yield, the income, and the consumption value.    The simulation results 
reported in Table 3 indicate that the mean values increase for either variable and that the 
poverty ratio and gap are reduced.    A sharp reduction of poverty gap in row (2) (from 
33.7 to 17.8) indicates the revitalization effectively improves poorer peoples’ livelihood.   
These results indicate that the negative impacts from the decline in collective 
management on the without-access farmers are so large that the revitalization of 
collective management can contribute significantly to reductions in poverty. 
 
3.  The diffusion of private wells and rice profit among well users 
  To test the second hypothesis, we estimate the reduced form regression of rice 
profit per hectare.    Rice profit is an appropriate measure of the degree of 
overexploitation and resulting welfare losses.    If groundwater becomes scarcer due to 
overexploitation, well users have to spend higher irrigation operation costs to acquire 
sufficient amount of irrigation water.    Our filed observations indicate that the operation 
of valuable assets like pumps is carried out mostly by family labor.    Therefore, we 
expect that well users’ rice profit after deducting family labor costs, in comparison with 
that of non users, will not be appreciably large under overexploitation.       14
  The estimated rice profit by irrigation status is shown on the column (4) in 
Table 2 based on the regression analysis that uses the same reduced form approach as 
the rice yield function (Table A2 in Appendix).    A key finding from this table is that, in 
comparison among “Active CM” villages (first and third rows), the profit of the farmers 
with “Well access” is not significantly different from that of the farmers with “No well 
access”.    This indicates that the use of well irrigation does not guarantee higher profit 
anymore in active villages, although farmers had adopted it for higher profit initially.   
Even worse is the case of the farmers with “Well access” in “Inactive CM” villages.   
The results indicate that once the collective management becomes inactive, rice profit 
turn to be negative (Rs. -123) even among well users.    This result possibly stems from 
the fact that the groundwater scarcity becomes more serious in inactive villages because 
the deteriorated tanks become unable to recharge the groundwater table through 
percolation.   
 
4.  Conclusion and policy implications 
  Facing recent rapid replacement of traditional irrigation systems by modern 
irrigation systems, this paper investigates the efficiency of modern systems’ water 
management and the impact of the decline in traditional systems.    A key finding is that   15
the dissemination of private wells results in double tragedies in that the non-well users 
suffer increased poverty due to the decline in collective management of tank irrigation 
systems and even the well users suffer reduced rice profit due to the overexploitation of 
groundwater.    If we look at the change of rice yield only, the dissemination of well 
irrigation systems seems to contribute a productivity  improvement.  However,  our 
research finds that abovementioned negative effects exist behind it.    We call these 
negative effects tragedies because no individual has incentive to correct them.    The 
negative effect on the non-well users is the one created by the well users’ exit from the 
collective management.    Since the well users do not suffer from the decline in 
collective tank management, they have no incentive to correct it.    Likewise, the effect 
among well users is the negative externality from one well user to other well users, and 
thus no incentive mechanism exists among each of them.    Without policy interventions, 
the correction of these tragedies is difficult. 
  As shown in the simulation results, supports for the revitalization of collective 
management can effectively reduce poverty.    One possible support for the 
revitalization is the construction of lined channels by blocks or cement.    This 
technology significantly reduces the labor required for maintenance work and also 
increases the availability of water by minimizing seepage.    Even after experiencing the   16
exit of well users from collective management, the maintenance work becomes feasible 
by the remaining smaller number of tank users.     
  Charging an appropriate fee for electricity would also contribute to prevent 
double tragedies.    Under the present practice of free electricity for agricultural 
purposes, the number of electric pumps tends to be more than the social optimum, 
resulting not only in the overexploitation of groundwater but also in the decline in 
collective management.    Not only the cost of power but also the social cost due to the 
negative externality of groundwater overexploitation must be charged, albeit it is not 
easy to estimate the social cost.    In order to deter the dissemination of private wells, 
another possible policy may be to charge a sales tax on pump sets.    Then, the 
government may use the revenues from electricity charge or from pump sales tax for 
tank revitalization projects.    This transfer can be considered legitimate because the 
well users will receive indirect benefit from the revitalized tanks in that the water from 
the tank permeates to re-supply the groundwater table.    The amount of indirect benefit 
would be estimated with collaboration with engineers, which we leave for our future 
research.     17
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Table 1: Comparison of rice yield, income, consumption value, and subjective poverty 
assessment of sample households between collective management inactive villages 
and active villages 
 
















(1) Rice yield (kg./hectare)       
Mean 3499  3786  -287  (2.59)*** 
Std. Dev.  1275  1049   
(2) Per capita monthly income 
(Rs./person) 
a       
Mean 332  395  -63  (1.77)* 
Std. Dev.  370  363   
Head count ratio of poverty (P0) 
b  58.5  48.3  10.2 
Poverty gap (P1) 
b  33.7  21.6  12.1 
(3) Per capita monthly consumption value 
(Rs./person) 
a      
Mean 308  336  -28  (1.46) 
Std. Dev.  194  202   
Head count ratio of poverty (P0) 
b  52.0  45.5  6.5 
Poverty gap (P1) 
b  19.8  14.2  5.6 
(4) Subjective poverty assessment       
Percentage of villages assessing that 
the current condition of poverty is 
serious (%) 
61 29   
* significant at 10% level; *** significant at 1% level 
 
Notes: 
a The value is converted into per capita base using the adult equivalent number of present household 
members.    See footnote 3 for details of the conversion method.     
b International poverty line of $US 1 per day adjusted for purchasing power parity is used.       19
Table 2: Estimated yield, income, consumption value, and rice profit by irrigation status 
 



























c  3979 531  382 1032 
Well access 
Inactive CM 
c  4088 531  382 -123 
No well access 
Active CM 
c  3642 342  307 1032 
No well access 
Inactive CM
 c  3225 262  263 -376 
 
Notes: 
The coefficients significant at 10% or lower are considered to have impact on the dependent variable. 
a Estimated value based on the OLS regression results in Table A2 
b Estimated value based on the IV regression results in Table A3 
c CM stands for collective management   20
Table 3: Simulation results of the impact of revitalization of collective management on rice 
yield, income, and consumption value. 
 






(1) Yield (kg./hectare)     
Mean 3499  3673 
Std. Dev.  1275  1174 




Mean 332  400 
Std. Dev.  370  360 
Head count ratio of poverty (P0) 
b  58.5 48.0 
Poverty gap (P1) 
b 33.7  17.8 




Mean 308  325 
Std. Dev.  194  177 
Head count ratio of poverty (P0) 
b 52.0  47.4 
Poverty gap (P1) 
b 19.8  13.9 
 
Notes: 
a The value is converted into per capita base using the adult equivalent number of present household 
members.    See footnote 3 for details of the conversion method.     
b International poverty line of $US 1 per day adjusted for purchasing power parity is used.     
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Appendix: 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for regression analyses of the determinants of yield, income, and consumption 
value 
 Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Dependent variables    
Yield  (kg./hectare)  3676.8 1147.7 
Per capita monthly income (Rs.)  371.0 366.8 
Per capita monthly consumption (Rs.)  325.4 199.1 
Rice profit per hectare (Rs.)  1226.6 2965.4 
    
Explanatory variables    
Variable related with collective management    
  Inactive  collective  management  (inactive=1)  0.38  
No-access-to-well (no access=1)  0.72  
Distance from tank (km.)  0.418 .464 
Household characteristics    
  Primary  educ  rate 
a  0.325 0.264 
  Secondary  educ  rate 
a  0.410 0.285 
  College  educ  rate 
a  0.024 0.086 
  Average  age
b  37.56 6.46 
Average age squared
b  1452.5 514.5 
    No. of working member  4.13 1.99 
  Rice  plot  size  (ha.)  0.927 0.710 
  Rice  plot  size  (ha.)  1.362 2.767 
    Tank-irrigable plot per working member (ha.)
 b  0.295 0.270 
    Tank-irrigable plot per working member sq.
 b  0.160 0.358 
Tank-un-irrigable plot per working member (ha.)
 b  0.232 0.454 
    Tank-un-irrigable plot per working member sq.
 b  0.260 1.588 
    Value of animal holdings per working member (000 Rs.)
 b  3.995 5.184 
    Value of animal holdings per working member sq.
 b  42.77 132.81 
    Owner of tractor (yes=1)    0.0267  
    Male HH head (male=1)  0.971  
Village characteristics    
Male wage (Rs./day)  56.03 9.57 
Annual rainfall (mm)  1009.7 351.8 
Average rainfall for 10 years (mm)  832.2 129.0 
Accessibility by vehicle (yes=1)  1.942 0.910 
Percentage of HH with electricity at home (%)  68.13 22.49 
a The rate to the number of working members.     
b Divided by the number of working members. 
   22
Table A2: Results of regression analyses of the determinants of rice yield, agricultural labor income, and 
non-agricultural income 
 
Dep. Var. Rice  yield  Rice profit per acre 
 OLS  OLS 
Variables related with irrigation status    
No-access&Active 
  -337.0  -326.3 
  (1.70)*  (0.81) 
 No-access&Inactive
   -754.4  -2,607.2 
  (2.11)**  (5.33)*** 
 Access&Inactive
   773.2  -1,155.7 
  (2.37)**  (1.82)* 
  Distance from tank (km.)  120.3  -2,026.2 
  (0.67)  (3.97)*** 
 No-access&Active*Distance
   -296.5  986.1 
  (1.14)  (1.52) 
 No-access&Inactive*Distance
   -155.2  2,219.9 
  (0.41)  (3.23)*** 
 Access&Inactive*Distance
   -1219.4  614.9 
  (3.51)***  (0.55) 
Household characteristics    
  Primary  educ  rate 
a  376.1  979.7 
  (1.36)  (1.67)* 
  Secondary  educ  rate 
a  668.0  1,522.7 
  (2.59)**  (2.81)*** 
  College  educ  rate 
a  1,033.6  1,668.6 
  (1.78)*  (1.19) 
  Av.  age 
b  11.1  66.8 
  (0.19)  (0.45) 
  Av.  age  sq. 
b  -0.3  -1.1 
  (0.37)  (0.58) 
  Rice  plot  size  (ha.)  -502.9  2,989.1 
  (2.36)**  (7.61)*** 
    Rice plot size sq. (ha.)  81.5  -509.0 
  (1.58)  (5.02)*** 
    Av. Value of animal holdings 
b (1000 Rs.)  60.9  69.5 
  (3.16)***  (1.54) 
    Av. Value of animal holdings sq.
 b   -1.3  -0.6 
  (2.32)**  (0.33) 
    No. of working member  43.6  -30.0 
  (1.50)  (0.47) 
    Owner of tractor (owner=1)  37.3  418.7 
  (0.08)  (0.54) 
    Male HH head (male=1)  366.6  953.2 
  (1.26)  (1.40) 
Village characteristics    
  Male daily wage rate (Rs./day)  10.6  -35.9 
  (0.89)  (2.84)*** 
  Annual rain fall (mm)  -0.1  -0.5 
  (0.86)  (1.48) 
Accessibility by vehicle (yes=1)  -12.8  164.7 
  (0.11)  (1.20) 
  Percentage of HH with electricity (%)  -7.1  -10.2 
  (1.62)  (1.83)* 
Const  3274.1  381.5 
  (2.49)**  (0.12) 
F-stat for endogeneity test  0.88 [0.51]  0.96[0.45] 
R
2  0.20   0.38   
Clustering robust t-statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
Notes: 
Since endogeniety is not detected in the functions above, only the OLS results are shown.    See F-stat for endogeniety test at 
the bottom of the table.       
a The rate to the number of working members.     
b Divided by the number of working members.   23
Table A3: Results of regression analyses of the determinants of household consumption value 
and income 
Dep. Var.  Adult equivalent per cap. monthly 
consumption value 
Adult equivalent per cap. monthly 
income 
 OLS IV OLS  IV 
Variables related with irrigation status      
No-access&Active 
c  -84.1 -75.1  -210.9  -189.9 
  (2.87)*** (2.54)** (3.65)***  (3.40)*** 
 No-access&Inactive
 c  -124.6 -119.1 -286.8 -269.5 
  (3.05)*** (3.06)*** (3.79)*** (3.60)*** 
 Access&Inactive
 c  83.9 101.7 -5.8  17.3 
  (1.37) (1.57) (0.06) (0.16) 
  Distance from tank (km.)  -46.1 -50.7  -125.4  -119.1 
  (1.32) (1.30)  (2.00)**  (1.70)* 
 No-access&Active*Distance
 c  15.2 26.4 37.3 33.7 
  (0.37) (0.49) (0.52) (0.36) 
 No-access&Inactive*Distance
 c  23.5 26.5 41.2 29.9 
  (0.52) (0.55) (0.53) (0.35) 
 Access&Inactive*Distance
 c  -95.6 -96.5 -55.7 -70.0 
  (1.49) (1.40) (0.55) (0.63) 
Household characteristics       
  Primary  educ  rate 
a  105.0 107.7 -34.7 -30.5 
  (2.44)** (2.50)**  (0.50)  (0.44) 
  Secondary  educ  rate 
a  61.4 60.6 -23.9  -23.0 
  (1.65) (1.59) (0.39) (0.37) 
  College  educ  rate 
a  476.6 475.9 684.3 685.3 
  (3.57)*** (3.55)***  (2.32)**  (2.32)** 
  Av.  age 
b  -0.9 -1.4 9.8  9.3 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.72) (0.69) 
  Av.  age  sq. 
b  -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 
  (0.15) (0.10) (1.24) (1.22) 
Av. Tank-irrigable plot
 b (ha.)  287.9 293.2 442.8 453.7 
  (3.65)*** (3.76)*** (2.96)*** (3.05)*** 
    Av. Tank-irrigable plot sq.
 b   -76.7 -76.9  0.2  -2.0 
  (1.39) (1.41) (0.00) (0.02) 
  Av.  Tank-un-irrigable  plot 
b (ha.)  74.3 71.9  440.7  440.5 
  (1.64) (1.61)  (5.35)***  (5.32)*** 
    Av. Tank-un-irrigable plot sq.
 b   -16.6 -16.6 -94.3 -94.8 
  (1.67)* (1.68)*  (4.19)***  (4.22)*** 
    Av. Value of animal holdings 
b (1000 Rs.)  -0.9 -0.9 6.3  6.3 
  (0.23) (0.25) (1.10) (1.09) 
    Av. Value of animal holdings sq.
 b   0.1 0.1 -0.2  -0.2 
  (0.66) (0.65) (0.71) (0.72) 
    No. of working member  1.9 2.2  20.6  21.2 
  (0.39) (0.43)  (2.26)**  (2.33)** 
    Owner of tractor (owner=1)  -0.5 -2.9  155.8  151.4 
  (0.01) (0.05)  (2.24)**  (2.10)** 
    Male HH head (male=1)  -14.1 -14.1 74.9  75.9 
  (0.24) (0.25) (0.76) (0.78) 
Village characteristics      
  Male daily wage rate (Rs./day)  1.7 1.7 -0.7  -0.7 
  (0.83) (0.83) (0.30) (0.30) 
  Average rain fall for 10 years (mm)  0.0 0.0     
  (0.11) (0.06)     
  Annual rain fall (mm)     -0.0  -0.0 
     (0.65)  (0.64) 
Accessibility by vehicle (yes=1)  -12.4 -13.6 -11.7 -12.7 
  (0.81) (0.87) (0.53) (0.57) 
  Percentage of HH with electricity (%)  -0.1 -0.1 0.6  0.6 
  (0.13) (0.19) (0.77) (0.76) 
Const  238.4 246.1 180.1 170.7 
  (0.75) (0.77) (0.51) (0.50) 
F-stat for endogeneity test  2.41 [0.03]    2.10 [0.05]   
Joint significant test on instruments (First stage F 
test) 
  [0.00] for all six 
end. vars. 
  [0.00] for all six 
end. vars. 
χ
2 stat for over identification test    20.1 [0.07]    18.0 [0.11] 
R
2  0.29 0.29 0.45 0.45 
Clustering robust t-statistics in parentheses.    * significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
Notes: Since F-stat for endogeniety test show a possibility of endogeniety in the two functions above, both the OLS and the 
IV results are shown.  For these two functions, the F-tests on the instruments in the first stage regression are highly 
significant for all six endogenous variables, indicating high predictive power.  The over-identification tests show the 
difficulty of rejection of exogeneity of the instruments at the 5 per cent significance level, adding confidence to the validity of 
our IV specifications. 
a The rate to the number of working members.     
b Divided by the number of working members. 
c Instrumented variable.     